I. INTRODUCTION.

II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.

III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK.

VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID.

VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.

VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.

IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.

X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY.

XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE.

XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES.

XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK.

XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK.

XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY.

XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK.

XX. STONEWALL JACKSON.

XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.

XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.

XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE.

XXIV. THE NEW LINES.

XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE.

XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS.

XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT.

XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.

XXIX. SALEM CHURCH.

XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY.

XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS.

XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS.

XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS.

XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.

XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.

XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.

XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.

APPENDIX.

Transcriber's Appendix: Transcription notes: