Logic, Inductive and Deductive
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UNIVERSITY MANUALS
EDITED BY PROFESSOR KNIGHT
LOGIC
INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE
INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE
LOGIC
INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE
LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1915
LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1915
PREFACE.
GENERAL PLAN OF THE SERIES.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
I.
II.
III.
INTRODUCTION.
I.
II.
III.
BOOK I.
THE LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY—SYLLOGISM AND DEFINITION.
PART I.
THE ELEMENTS OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
THE LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY—SYLLOGISM AND DEFINITION.
PART I.
THE ELEMENTS OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
PART II.
DEFINITION.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
PART III.
THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
PART IV.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
Chapter V.
Chapter VI.
Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII.
Chapter IX.
DEFINITION.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
PART III.
THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
PART IV.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
Chapter V.
Chapter VI.
Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII.
Chapter IX.
BOOK II.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC, OR THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
Chapter V.
Chapter VI.
Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII.
Chapter IX.
Chapter X.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC, OR THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
Chapter V.
Chapter VI.
Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII.
Chapter IX.
Chapter X.
INTRODUCTION.
I.—THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF LOGIC.
II.—LOGIC AS A PREVENTIVE OF ERROR OR FALLACY.—THE INNER SOPHIST.
The Bias of Impatient Impulse.
The Bias of Happy Exercise.
The Bias of the Feelings.
The Bias of Custom.
III.—THE AXIOMS OF DIALECTIC AND OF SYLLOGISM.
I.—THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF LOGIC.
II.—LOGIC AS A PREVENTIVE OF ERROR OR FALLACY.—THE INNER SOPHIST.
The Bias of Impatient Impulse.
The Bias of Happy Exercise.
The Bias of the Feelings.
The Bias of Custom.
III.—THE AXIOMS OF DIALECTIC AND OF SYLLOGISM.
BOOK I.
THE LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY. SYLLOGISM AND DEFINITION.
PART I.
THE ELEMENTS OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
GENERAL NAMES AND ALLIED DISTINCTIONS.
Chapter II.
THE SYLLOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS INTO TERMS.
I.—The Bare Analytic Forms.
II.—The Practice of Syllogistic Analysis.
III.—Some Technical Difficulties.
THE ELEMENTS OF PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I.
GENERAL NAMES AND ALLIED DISTINCTIONS.
Chapter II.
THE SYLLOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS INTO TERMS.
I.—The Bare Analytic Forms.
II.—The Practice of Syllogistic Analysis.
III.—Some Technical Difficulties.
PART II.
DEFINITION.
Chapter I.
IMPERFECT UNDERSTANDING OF WORDS AND THE REMEDIES THEREFOR.—DIALECTIC.—DEFINITION.
I.—Verification of the Meaning—Dialectic.
II.—Principles of Division or Classification and Definition.
Chapter II.
THE FIVE PREDICABLES.—VERBAL AND REAL PREDICATION.
Chapter III.
ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES.
Chapter IV.
THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT UNIVERSALS. —DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE RELATION OF GENERAL NAMES TO THOUGHT AND TO REALITY.
DEFINITION.
Chapter I.
IMPERFECT UNDERSTANDING OF WORDS AND THE REMEDIES THEREFOR.—DIALECTIC.—DEFINITION.
I.—Verification of the Meaning—Dialectic.
II.—Principles of Division or Classification and Definition.
Chapter II.
THE FIVE PREDICABLES.—VERBAL AND REAL PREDICATION.
Chapter III.
ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES.
Chapter IV.
THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT UNIVERSALS. —DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE RELATION OF GENERAL NAMES TO THOUGHT AND TO REALITY.
PART III.
THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS. —OPPOSITION AND IMMEDIATE INFERENCE.
Chapter I.
THEORIES OF PREDICATION.—THEORIES OF JUDGMENT.
Chapter II.
THE "OPPOSITION" OF PROPOSITIONS.—THE INTERPRETATION OF "NO".
Chapter III.
THE IMPLICATION OF PROPOSITIONS. —IMMEDIATE FORMAL INFERENCE.—EDUCATION.
Æquipollent or Equivalent Forms—Obversion.
Conversion.
Table of Contrapositive Converses.
Other Forms of Immediate Inference.
Chapter IV.
THE COUNTER-IMPLICATION OF PROPOSITIONS.
The Law of Homogeneous Counter-relativity.
THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS. —OPPOSITION AND IMMEDIATE INFERENCE.
Chapter I.
THEORIES OF PREDICATION.—THEORIES OF JUDGMENT.
Chapter II.
THE "OPPOSITION" OF PROPOSITIONS.—THE INTERPRETATION OF "NO".
Chapter III.
THE IMPLICATION OF PROPOSITIONS. —IMMEDIATE FORMAL INFERENCE.—EDUCATION.
Æquipollent or Equivalent Forms—Obversion.
Conversion.
Table of Contrapositive Converses.
Other Forms of Immediate Inference.
Chapter IV.
THE COUNTER-IMPLICATION OF PROPOSITIONS.
The Law of Homogeneous Counter-relativity.
PART IV.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROPOSITIONS.—MEDIATE INFERENCE.—SYLLOGISM.
Chapter I.
THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter II.
FIGURES AND MOODS OF THE SYLLOGISM.
I.—The First Figure.
II.—The Minor Figures Of the Syllogism, And Their Reduction To the First.
III.—The Sorites.
Chapter III.
THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC MOODS. —THE CANONS OF THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter IV.
THE ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS INTO SYLLOGISTIC FORMS.
I.—First Figure.
II.—Second Figure.
Third Figure.
Examples for Analysis.
Chapter V.
ENTHYMEMES.
Chapter VI.
THE UTILITY OF THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter VII.
CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS.—HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM, AND DILEMMA.
I.—Hypothetical Syllogisms.
Questions Connected with Hypothetical Syllogisms.
II.—Disjunctive Syllogisms.
III.—The Dilemma.
Chapter VIII.
FALLACIES IN DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT.—PETITIO PRINCIPII AND IGNORATIO ELENCHI.
Chapter IX.
FORMAL OR ARISTOTELIAN INDUCTION.—INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROPOSITIONS.—MEDIATE INFERENCE.—SYLLOGISM.
Chapter I.
THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter II.
FIGURES AND MOODS OF THE SYLLOGISM.
I.—The First Figure.
II.—The Minor Figures Of the Syllogism, And Their Reduction To the First.
III.—The Sorites.
Chapter III.
THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC MOODS. —THE CANONS OF THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter IV.
THE ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS INTO SYLLOGISTIC FORMS.
I.—First Figure.
II.—Second Figure.
Third Figure.
Examples for Analysis.
Chapter V.
ENTHYMEMES.
Chapter VI.
THE UTILITY OF THE SYLLOGISM.
Chapter VII.
CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS.—HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM, AND DILEMMA.
I.—Hypothetical Syllogisms.
Questions Connected with Hypothetical Syllogisms.
II.—Disjunctive Syllogisms.
III.—The Dilemma.
Chapter VIII.
FALLACIES IN DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT.—PETITIO PRINCIPII AND IGNORATIO ELENCHI.
Chapter IX.
FORMAL OR ARISTOTELIAN INDUCTION.—INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT.
BOOK II.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC, OR THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE.
INTRODUCTION.
Chapter I.
THE DATA OF EXPERIENCE AS GROUNDS OF INFERENCE OR RATIONAL BELIEF.
Chapter II.
ASCERTAINMENT OF SIMPLE FACTS IN THEIR ORDER.—PERSONAL OBSERVATION.—HEARSAY EVIDENCE—METHOD OF TESTING TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE.
I.—Personal Observation.
II.—Tradition.—Hearsay Evidence.
III.—Method of Testing Traditional Evidence.
Chapter III.
ASCERTAINMENT OF FACTS OF CAUSATION.
I.—Post Hoc ergo Propter Hoc.
II.—Meaning of "Cause".—Methods of Observation—Mill's Experimental Methods.
Chapter IV.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—SINGLE DIFFERENCE.
I.—The Principle of Single Difference.— Mill's "Canon".
II.—Application of the Principle.
Chapter V.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—ELIMINATION.—SINGLE AGREEMENT.
I.—The Principle of Elimination.
II.—The Principle of Single Agreement.
III.—Mill's "Joint Method of Agreement and Difference".
Chapter VI.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—MINOR METHODS.
I.—Concomitant Variations.
II.—Single Residue.
Chapter VII.
THE METHOD OF EXPLANATION.
II.—Obstacles to Explanation.—Plurality of Causes and Intermixture of Effects.
III.—The Proof of a Hypothesis.
Chapter VIII.
SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS OF INVESTIGATION.
I.—The Maintenance of Averages.—Supplement to the Method of Difference.
II.—The Presumption from Extra-Casual Coincidence.
Chapter IX.
PROBABLE INFERENCE TO PARTICULARS—THE MEASUREMENT OF PROBABILITY.
Chapter X.
INFERENCE FROM ANALOGY.
Transcriber's Note
Transcriber's Note
INTRODUCTION.
Chapter I.
THE DATA OF EXPERIENCE AS GROUNDS OF INFERENCE OR RATIONAL BELIEF.
Chapter II.
ASCERTAINMENT OF SIMPLE FACTS IN THEIR ORDER.—PERSONAL OBSERVATION.—HEARSAY EVIDENCE—METHOD OF TESTING TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE.
I.—Personal Observation.
II.—Tradition.—Hearsay Evidence.
III.—Method of Testing Traditional Evidence.
Chapter III.
ASCERTAINMENT OF FACTS OF CAUSATION.
I.—Post Hoc ergo Propter Hoc.
II.—Meaning of "Cause".—Methods of Observation—Mill's Experimental Methods.
Chapter IV.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—SINGLE DIFFERENCE.
I.—The Principle of Single Difference.— Mill's "Canon".
II.—Application of the Principle.
Chapter V.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—ELIMINATION.—SINGLE AGREEMENT.
I.—The Principle of Elimination.
II.—The Principle of Single Agreement.
III.—Mill's "Joint Method of Agreement and Difference".
Chapter VI.
METHODS OF OBSERVATION.—MINOR METHODS.
I.—Concomitant Variations.
II.—Single Residue.
Chapter VII.
THE METHOD OF EXPLANATION.
II.—Obstacles to Explanation.—Plurality of Causes and Intermixture of Effects.
III.—The Proof of a Hypothesis.
Chapter VIII.
SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS OF INVESTIGATION.
I.—The Maintenance of Averages.—Supplement to the Method of Difference.
II.—The Presumption from Extra-Casual Coincidence.
Chapter IX.
PROBABLE INFERENCE TO PARTICULARS—THE MEASUREMENT OF PROBABILITY.
Chapter X.
INFERENCE FROM ANALOGY.
Transcriber's Note
Transcriber's Note
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